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RICHARD H. CONDON
NEARING THE END: MAINE’S RURAL COMMUNITY,
1929-1945
On October 1, 1940 in Mechanic Falls, Maine, Mrs. Lillian 
Watson, mother of five, wrote a letter to the Farm Security 
Administration. She had just received a “Consumer’s Guide” 
that told of a home weaving program in North Carolina. Was 
such training and a loom available in Maine? If not, she added, 
“could you tell me of something else I could do to increase our 
income?” Although the family had a large garden and she had 
already canned more than 300 quarts of vegetables, she noted, 
“it does not pay bills. We owe hospital, doctors, back rent, notes, 
etc. ” She explained that" the mill where my husband works is not 
running hardly any” and there were no other industries in the 
small town. Her husband had many talents and wanted desper­
ately to work: “I always feel like a beggar every time we have an 
unemployment compensation check. That is not what we are 
looking for.”1
Mrs. Watson’s letter does not call up the usual dramatic 
images of the “dirty thirties”: Hoovervilles, breadlines, Okies. 
But the Great Depression was real for her, as it was for most 
Mainers. The 40 percent of them, like the Watsons, who lived in 
small towns but did not farm helped make Maine a very rural 
state; since only 20 per cent farmed, it was no Kansas or Iowa. 
But when commodity prices fell, farmers bought less, debts 
mounted, and their taxes went unpaid. The economic health of 
Maine’s small towns was inextricably linked to the fate of Maine 
agriculture. Most rural Mainers owned their own land, raised 
their own vegetables, and cut their own wood.2 Thus they staved 
off the worst effects of the Depression for some time.3 In the 
past, rural people like Mrs. Watson had simply worked harder in 
order to remain independent during hard times. But the 1930s 
were different: farmers were more dependent on commercial 
crops, and with the collapse of the market economy, even the 
hardest work often brought little reward. And as as the date of
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Dexter, Maine, in the 1930s. Communities like Dexter experienced wrenching social changes as citizens confronted the profound economic crisis 
that decade brought. They turned first to family and community resources, then to the state, and finally to the federal government. This changing 
orientation signaled a reluctant break with the past.
Bert Call photo, courtesy Dexter Historical Society and the University o f M aine Special Collections Department.
MAINE'S RURAL COMMUNITY
Mrs. Watson’s letter indicates, hard times persisted for eleven 
long years after the stock-market crash.
Local authorities, traditionally the only resort of the poor, 
were unable to deal effectively with unprecedented relief de­
mands these years brought. Many failed to provide even mini­
mum services. The state had always played a limited role, and 
except when managing federal policies and funds, it did little 
more in the Depression era, hobbled as it was by an antiquated 
fiscal system, decades of almost unbroken one-party rule, and 
leaders unwilling to experiment. In her letter, Mrs. Watson 
confidently looked beyond town and state to Washington, not 
for a hand out but for a hand up. Her response to hard times, 
a plea directed not to a familiar government in Augusta but to a 
far-off Washington administration, was telling. It illustrates a 
fundamental shift in orientation brought on by a decade of 
closer contacts with distant markets, distant cultures, and distant 
governmental authorities. How did this great transformation 
come about, and how did it affect the average Mainer?
When the Great Depression began, 40,000 Maine farms 
had already experienced decades of slow transition from exten­
sive, subsistence “farming as a way of life” to intensive, commer­
cial “farming for a living.” On about one-half of them, the farmer 
and his family still made ends meet with varied and changing 
combinations of crops and livestock. They farmed a variety of 
crops, cut wood in winter, fished, if near the coast, or took part- 
time jobs in neighboring cities and towns. The other half, 
specializing in potatoes, milk, eggs, poultry, apples, sweet corn, 
or some combination thereof, generally did better, but they were 
also more likely to be challenged by interregional competition, 
victimized by high transportation costs, and caught up in an 
increasingly complex market system which made decisions for 
them.4 The Depression spread these pressures among a vastly 
larger share of the rural population.
First to feel the effects of the Depression were those farmers 
heavily committed to commercial crops. Maine’s most notable 
commercial farmers were the potato growers of its huge north­
ernmost county. Aroostook led the nation in yield per acre,
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Farmers most heavily committed to commercial crops were first to feel the Depression. 
Strongly individualistic, Maine farmers often spurned cooperatives and common brand 
labels or advertising — tactics that helped cushion producers in other states against the 
worst effects of the Depression.
University o f M aim  Experiment Station, Special Collections Department.
potatoes raised, and in production of seed potatoes; in certain 
years, such as 1919 and 1925, high prices made farmers rich. But 
Americans were eating fewer potatoes, and those they consumed 
came increasingly from western producers.5 Failing to respond 
effectively, most of Aroostook’s strongly individualistic growers 
spurned cooperatives, opposed a common brand label, and 
neglected to advertise — steps already taken by their ultimate 
conquerors in Idaho.6 Saddled with these preexisting handicaps, 
they were hit harder by the economic storms of the 1930s than 
their fellows elsewhere in Maine.
In 1929 “wonderful crops” of potatoes sold at the second- 
best prices of the decade. Hay, apples and sweet corn did very 
well, egg and broiler volume and prices rose, and milk returns 
increased. But only two years later the State Grange Master 
noted that apple growers and potato growers were facing some 
of the worst markets in recent years. Increased acreage and 
favorable weaihei produced a bumper crop of potatoes, which
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sold at prices far below the cost of production.7 The Maine farm 
price index had fallen in 1932 to 37 percent below pre-war 
conditions, compared to a wholesale price index that had fallen 
only 5 percent.8
Through the decade Maine farm prices remained below 
those of 1910-1914, the years selected by experts as agriculture’s 
best. Potato growers, averaging only 83 percent of that standard, 
did worst; dairy and poultry farmers achieved about 93 percent 
of it. Apple growers (102 percent) had the most purchasing 
power, although the savage winter of 1933-1934 killed tens of 
thousands of trees and damaged the buds of many more. 
Production thus fell by more than two-thirds in 1934, but “fairly 
satisfactory returns’7 came the next year. The disaster also forced 
orchardists to convert to more hardy and popular varieties.9 The 
far more numerous dairy and poultry farmers endured “very 
unsatisfactory” prices for milk in 1933, and only “slightly better” 
conditions in 1934.10
Potato farmers in 1934 planted more acres and harvested 
record yields — the largest crop to that time.11 The potatoes that 
were actually sold (and millions of bushels were simply dumped) 
went for thirty-five to forty cents for a 165-pound barrel; the crop 
brought in about $8 million less than it had cost to produce. By 
the end of 1934 Aroostook farmers owed $28 million, more than 
one-half the value of their real estate. To make matters worse, 
those smaller farmers and laborers who had once cut wood in the 
winter were now often idle, as pulpwood consumption fell by 
nearly one-fifth between 1930 and 1933. At the same time the 
Bangor and Aroostook Railroad carried less than one-quarter of 
the lumber it had hauled in 1929.12
General price statistics and crop estimates tell us little of the 
effects of the Depression as it affected other aspects of rural life. 
To supplement them, historians use the memories of survivors, 
contemporary newspapers, and annual town reports. Reports 
from twelve municipalities selected to represent the different 
sections of the state, the larger and smaller communities, regions 
of major crop specializations, and richer and poorer communi­
ties are full of the signs of hard times: growing lists of tax
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delinquents, swelling payments for the town’s poor and of 
wandering, homeless men and women, pay cuts for road labor­
ers, teachers paid in scrip or not at all, and schools closed.13
Replies to President Roosevelt’s September 1935 form 
letter asking clergy across the country to describe conditions in 
their areas provide other revealing information. For instance, 
the Rev. Augustine J. Alvery of Limestone, in central Aroostook 
County, minced no words: “General conditions are extremely 
bad...Aroostook...finds itself today bankrupt: taxes unpaid for 
the past three years, farms heavily mortgaged, many towns 
unable to operate their schools, universal beggary in sight 
peppered with rowdyism and sinking of public morality. ” Alvery 
suggested aid to Aroostook banks and a road-building pro­
gram. 14 Sixty miles northwest of Alvery’s Limestone, conditions 
were probably worse in the St.John Valley. Here one local priest 
described the situation among the mainly French-speaking people: 
“in their miserable hovels conditions are most unhygienic: there 
is over-crowding, the cold penetrates freely dyring our rigorous 
winters, clothing and comforts are lacking. Numerous heads of 
families are demoralized...and heart-broken at the thought of 
debts accumulating through heavy taxes and other financial 
obligations.” Desperately, he urged "the Father of our nation” 
to “help his children in distress...with immediate aid.”15
Almost as depressed as Aroostook County were the coastal 
counties closest to New Brunswick. Many of Maine’s 3,500 
fishermen and 4,000 fish processing workers lived here; their 
income fell 50 percent during the 1930s. At Eastport, as Harry 
Hopkins’ emissary Lorena Hickok found in 1933, Norwegian 
competition and whales which had recently eaten most of the 
herring and “scared the rest away,” left the canneries running in 
only a “half-hearted sort of way.” Town authorities bought some 
"old shacks,” fixed them up, and moved some of the unemployed 
into them.16 The soil in that section was too thin for profitable 
farming, though some raked and canned wild blueberries. Some 
coastal men and women also tended lawns, cooked, and kept 
house at the "cottages” where the wealthy vacationed, or worked 
at the many large hotels of that day.
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Hard times for farmers along the coast got even harder during the Depression. Odd­
jobbing sometimes helped families scrape by, but some of the old standbys — seasonal 
work in the canneries, pulpwood cutting, town road work — grew scarce. Income at the 
eastern Maine fish processing plants dropped 50 percent.
Goode, TH E FISHERIES AND FISHERY INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STA TE S (1887), 
plate 133.
Further south and west along the coast, andjust inland from 
it, a hard life also got harder. Even fifty or seventy-five years 
earlier farming on the poor soil and broken terrain of Waldo, 
Knox, and Lincoln counties seldom supported a family. Logging 
and town road work brought a little cash for the mainly subsis­
tence economy, and town jobs drew off many of the young 
people; but in the 1930s the dem and for logs fell, towns could 
afford less for roads, and the outsidejobs were gone. Long-time 
county agent and agricultural historian Clarence Day inspected 
two towns and parts of three others in 1934, finding that 122 of 
428 farms were in “fair” condition, 226 “poor,” and 23 “falling 
to pieces.” A larger study over the next few years, covering 
nearly 2,000 farms in seventeen towns, proposed in vain to 
resettle the people on better land.17
Elsewhere, from the more populated southwestern coun­
ties where most of Maine’s larger towns were, to the foothills, the 
fertile Kennebec Valley and the central lowlands, general farm-
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ing, usually emphasizing milk, eggs, or broilers, continued. 
Indeed, the flight from the farms so apparent in the 1920s slowed 
down in the early 1930s. In the most urban parts of the state such 
as Cumberland and York counties, some town people moved to 
the country where at least they could raise a garden and cut wood 
for subsistence. Thus the census counted more farms in 1935 
than in 1930.18 Yet even here townspeople found life difficult. 
Ministers reported hard times to the president: “these country 
towns are too poor to repair their roads, let alone to improve 
them”; “two words will describe my parish: poverty-stricken.”19 
The response to the unprecedented crisis from individuals, 
town officials, and state politicians reflected Maine’s strong rural 
orientation and a heavy reluctance to abandon traditional ways 
of dealing with hard times. This, along with a number of 
structural sources of inflexibility, made the adjustment to mo­
dernity in Maine particularly difficult.
Relief of poverty was by custom and law the responsibility 
of each town; the state only helped those individuals not resident 
for at least five years in any locality. Until the early 1930s there 
had been few “paupers.” Their names, except those of veterans, 
were published in the annual town report and they lost their right 
to vote.20 Now, in the small western Maine town of Bethel, for 
instance, “some of the names listed as receiving relief [were] 
from families never before — or since — known to need public 
assistance.” Turner relieved fourteen families in 1932, thirty-six 
in 1933. They received food orders, not cash, and the able- 
bodied men among them were required to perform “some kind 
of labor for the town.”21 Lorena Hickok blamed inadequate 
relief pardy on “the town officials’ lack of generosity and their 
inherent mistrust of anybody who can’t get a job.”22
Aroostook County’s town officials were hard-pressed, as 
might be expected in view of the virtual collapse of potato and 
lumber prices. In March 1932 the selectmen of Fort Kent 
reported that “ the price of potatoes has been off all of the season, 
no lumbering of any kind is being done on the river, one Bank 
closed, tying up many thousands of the people’s money, men 
walking the streets seeking work and unable to find it, even
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offering their service for their board...” By then, the number of 
“town paupers” had quadrupled since 1928; but now the 254 
cases received, on average, only about one-third as much as the 
61 cases in 1928.23
If poor relief had been the towns' only duty, such unprec­
edented expenses would have strained their budgets. But towns 
also had other responsibilities, including road maintenance, 
never an easy task in Maine's climate. A common expedient was 
to use the able-bodied male “paupers” and those not yet reduced 
to beggary but still unable to pay all or part of their taxes, to work 
off at least some of their obligations on the roads. Thus, in 1933 
Maine led the nation in the percentage of its citizens so em­
ployed.24
Towns could not, of course, hire casual labor to teach, but 
they had to bear more than 80 percent of the cost of schools. 
Maine, indeed, ranked ninth from the bottom of the forty-eight 
states in its per capita support of education. The towns, 
especially the poorer ones that gained little from the state's weak 
attempts at equalization, had no choice except to slash their 
spending.25 In town after town, superintendents deplored the 
cuts, denounced state policies, and praised teachers for their 
sacrifices. “The situation in the rural schools, poor enough in 
ordinary times, has become worse during this depression, until 
many towns... are unable to maintain any but the most meager 
type of educational program.” Not only pupils but also teachers 
suffered. As the Turner superintendent pointed out in 1937, 
“Teachers in some towns are not paid, others are getting $10-12 
per week for 32 weeks. Clerks in the state- owned rum shops are 
getting $ 18 per week for the year.”26 Despite such strategies for 
riding out the storm, Bethel, Buckfield, and every town in our 
sample faced severe financial difficulties as unpaid taxes mounted. 
In 1936 Fort Kent had $58,039 in uncollected taxes; it owed 
$11,652 in county tax, $8,257 in state tax, $11,451 in “accounts 
payable,” and a crushing $ 100,205 in “notes payable.” The town 
was $88,750 in the red, and it was not alone.27 Conditions were 
so bad that the state created an Emergency Municipal Finance 
Board to help, and even in some cases run the affairs of towns
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that could not meet their commitments. Fort Kent was one of 
twenty-seven towns and plantations which, by the start of 1939, 
had received more than $ 1 million in aid. The Board had by then 
taken over the government of seven communities.28
The state government’s municipal rescue program was, 
unfortunately, an exception to its general role. Much more 
could have been done for both relief and recovery with a more 
effective fiscal system and more imaginative financial policies. 
With no sales or income tax, Maine in 1930 relied on a patchwork 
of fourteen taxes and ten other sources of revenue, the most 
important of which were automobile licenses and funded loans. 
Of the taxes, the 7.5 mill levy on real and personal property 
brought in the most, with the gasoline tax a fairly close second.29 
This structure hurt farmers; property tax totals had risen more 
than two and one-half times between 1910 and 1930, while 
farmers’ purchasing power had increased only slightly. Only 
four states in 1929 taxed real and personal property at higher 
rates than Maine.30 Year after year, Grangers urged the legisla­
ture to reduce this burden with taxes on intangible property and 
a state income tax. But that body, more friendly to wildland 
owners (taxed separately at a lower rate), paper companies, 
utilities and railroads, would not pass a state income tax, and the 
voters, in 1937, decisively rejected a sales tax.31 With tax reform, 
tax delinquencies would have been less serious, and the band-aid 
strategies of the Emergency Municipal Finance Board would 
have been less needed.
Such fiscal deficiencies could be overlooked in good times; 
in fact Maine had spent and borrowed freely in the 1920s, 
especially on roads, which absorbed in 1930 almost 50 percent 
of the total budget. The state, which owed less than $300,000 in 
1913 when the first Model-T’s were just appearing, owed more 
than $29 million in 1936.32 Therefore, especially in light of the 
pre-Keynesian horror of deficit financing, it would have been 
difficult to expand the state’s share of poor relief. Townsfolk had 
traditionally considered “interference” by the state or federal 
government an insinuation that locals were unqualified to deal 
with their own problems.33 In addition legislators, like the town
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leaders Lorena Hickok met, often objected philosophically (as 
well as financially) to relief.
Thus, in the fiscal year endingjune 30,1933, the state spent 
for relief only $571,000; the next year, $724,000; and injanuary 
1935, Democratic Governor Louis J. Brann estimated that 
$800,000 would be spent by June 30, 1935. By this time many 
cities and towns had reached the limit of their resources. 
Without federal relief — an amount ten times the state’s outlay 
the situation would have been far worse. Brann felt that “the 
state must recognize its own responsibility to relieve distress and 
suffering where municipalities are unable to act,” but state 
expenditures for relief under the Republican-dominated legisla­
ture rose only to $ 1 million by 1939. Much of this was spent on 
the old age pensions enacted in 1936 and on matching funds for 
the federal programs passed in 1935 as part of the Social Security 
Act. Needs always exceeded revenue, forcing the state to borrow 
from other departments and to increase its debt limit.34
Legislators did, beginning in 1935, start to help producers 
of Maine’s two most important farm products: milk and pota­
toes. About one-sixth of all Maine farms in 1930 sold milk. They 
were concentrated in the more heavily populated section south­
west of Bangor, especially in the lower Androscoggin and 
Kennebec valleys, and around Portland. Some produced milk 
for the Boston market; as interstate commerce, their sales came 
under the NRA’s federal marketing agreements after 1933. 
These farmers, and the larger group that sold within the state, 
had long been troubled by a surplus which depressed prices, 
especially in the spring and summer months when cows gave 
more milk. Hard times had worsened the situation. To deal with 
it, Maine, like twenty-three other states, empowered a Milk 
Control Board to fix prices paid to producers as well as retail 
prices. Both were generally established, in any case, by the levels 
set under federal orders in the interstate market.35 Despite this 
effort, dairy-farm purchasing power declined slightly in the later 
1930s.36
The Potato Branding Act of 1935 had more than a few 
similarities. It required farmers to pack and label spuds accord­
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ing to U.S. standard grades, with each package bearing the 
producer's name. The idea was not new — even some growers 
admitted that Idaho potatoes were better packaged and graded 
—but “opposition from small growers, dealers, and shippers who 
did not want restrictions placed on marketing low quality spuds” 
had defeated it in 1931 and 1933. After 1935, however, farmers 
had to grade their potatoes according to federal standards to be 
eligible for federal subsidy programs. But opposition soon 
reappeared. Legislators only headed off a repeal movement by 
creating two new, lower state grades that allowed culls to be 
shipped if they were fit for human consumption.37
A more helpful move was the 1937 tax of one cent per barrel 
shipped, to be divided among research into better handling 
methods, possible use of culls for by-products, market develop­
ment, and advertising. The Department of Agriculture hired a 
New York advertising agency to plan and carry out a campaign 
in urban Eastern newspapers, on radio, in chain-store displays, 
and so on, using the new red, white, and blue state label. 
Although moderately successful, the drive was handicapped by 
a long tradition of unwillingness to accommodate customers, by 
a lack of “merchandising instinct,” and above all by the long-term 
decline in potato consumption. Idaho, and Maine’s other 
competitors faced that too, but Idaho, at least, spent half again 
as much as Maine to advertise its product.38
Peter Corriveau wrote in a 1983 University of Maine master’s 
thesis that Maine did less than New Brunswick for its potato 
farmers. When the Canadian federal government seemed 
paralyzed, the province acted as a catalyst for better organization 
of the potato industry, bringing it a “modicum of relief.” Maine, 
in contrast, “influenced by powerful interests, turned away from 
helping farmers who were trying to help themselves.”39
The State Department of Agriculture, headed for more 
than twenty years by the able and energetic Frank P. Washburn, 
a farmer and former president of the Washington County Farm 
Bureau, tried to help farmers develop better marketing strate­
gies, but his funding and mandate were limited. The department 
was legally responsible for little more than inspecting seed
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potatoes and other products and testing fertilizers. It also tried 
to educate farmers by mounting, for instance, a substantial 
campaign to publicize the potato branding law. The departm ent 
also maintained close and cordial relations with the University’s 
Agricultural Experiment Station and Extension program .40
State and federal programs provided research programs designed to boost production, 
protect and market crops, and develop income alternatives for rural Mainers. This Maine 
Experiment Station photo, taken in 1938, was used to demonstrate the effects of fertilizer 
on crops in the Kennebec Valley.
The Experiment Station was the older o f these two Univer­
sity agencies. Set up in 1885, it antedated by two years the first 
federal act funding such work. W ashington for many years 
provided all its money, and even in 1940 contributed m ore than 
the state did to the station’s $206,000 income. Its staff did 
extensive and carefully-focused research involving entom olo­
gists, plant pathologists, biologists, chemists, agricultural econo­
mists, and hom e economists.41 The role of the University’s Farm 
Bureau, later called the Extension Service, was to take this work 
out to the farmers and their families and help them put it into 
practice. H ere again, a small and informal start at the University 
required major outside help, first private, then federal, to
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survive. By 1935 there were county agents, home demonstration 
agents (to work with women), and 4-H Club leaders in every 
county. A typical project was the improvement of dairy herds by 
encouraging dairy associations, butterfat testing, use of better 
bulls, and artificial insemination.42
The Department of Agriculture, the Experiment Station, 
and the Farm Bureau/Maine Extension Service all tried to 
spread the gospel of cooperation. But traditionally individualis­
tic Maine rural people were dubious, and cooperative ventures 
were few. One that survived and grew up, though the gestation 
was long, the birth-pangs severe, and the childhood hazardous, 
was the Maine Potato Growers, Inc. Its conception was a 1929 
suggestion from A.L. Deering, director of the Agricultural 
Experiment Station. Deering's proposal got little response until 
the ruinous prices of 1931. In the spring of 1932, a small number 
of farmers agreed to market their entire crop cooperatively. 
Most, however, stood aloof, permitting a few large dealers to 
control most of the business to the disadvantage of farmers and 
small dealers. Because so few participated, the MPG lacked 
capital and lost money at first. In the late 1930s, however, it grew 
until it shipped almost 10 per cent of the crop. During the flush 
wartime years it doubled this share.43
Times were still very hard in late 1935 when the Aroostook 
County Farm Bureau took the lead, with help from Maine 
Extension Service economists, in a group called the Aroostook 
County Council. Practically all interests were represented in its 
ranks: the Aroostook Federation of Farmers (mostly a fertilizer 
cooperative), the Grange, the Chamber of Commerce, bankers 
and Farm Credit Association people, dealers, shippers, and the 
Bangor and Aroostook Railroad. The Council's twelve recom­
mendations, however, hardly pointed to radical change. Some, 
including “promotion of better methods of farm finance” and 
“establishment of more uniform methods of selling potatoes,” 
were quite vague, though more practical suggestions, like adver­
tising and soil conservation, were soon pursued. Others, such as 
better methods of utilizing culls and the introduction of “prac­
tical supplementary crops and livestock” are hardy perennials in 
Aroostook County.44
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The federal government played only an indirect role in the 
formation of the County Council. That unusual example of 
cooperation owed much to the powerful emotions sparked by 
Washington’s moves toward freer trade. Roosevelt and Secre­
tary of State Cordell Hull, certain that opening more foreign 
markets would help recovery, got Congress to agree in 1934 to 
allow negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements country-by- 
country. By early 1935, an agreement with Canada was under 
consideration. It included a clause lowering the duty on the first 
750,000 bushels of Canadian seed potatoes imported each year 
from seventy-five cents to forty-five cents per hundred pounds. 
Aroostook reacted furiously, with mass meetings, letter-writing 
campaigns, and appeals to Hull and Roosevelt directed through 
Representative Ralph O. Brewster and Governor Brann. The 
campaign failed, but ironically Canadian exports to the United 
States continued at the same level in 1935-1938 as they had been 
in 1930-1935.45
Rural Maine’s reluctance to alter traditional ways of dealing 
with hard times carried over to its relations with the federal 
government. Relations between state leaders, even a Democrat 
like Brann, and Washington were sometimes tense. Maine was 
one of only two states that never cast its vote for FDR. Maine’s 
small towns had been, with few exceptions, consistently and 
heavily Republican since the 1850s. In 1936, for example, our 
twelve-town sample averaged 61 percent for the GOP presiden­
tial candidate.46 The Democratic party, based largely in mill 
towns with many Franco-Americans, was too weak to carry the 
state. Maine’s rural Republicans were not convinced, as many 
were in the Midwest, that harder-than-usual times justified 
breaking tradition. The philosophy underlying the New Deal 
challenged rural individualism and the doctrine of self-reliance. 
This ideological posture, coupled with Roosevelt’s seemingly 
unfavorable tariff policies, outweighed the benefits that came 
with the New Deal programs.
Still, federal programs implemented during the 1930s had 
far greater impact than local and state responses to the Depres­
sion. Before the New Deal, Herbert Hoover’s 1929 farm legisla­
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tion had done nothing for Maine. His Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation eventually included grants to states to use for relief. 
At first Governor William Tudor Gardiner thought that Maine 
could get along without any help, but in 1933 the state took some 
RFC money. Houlton received at least $4,500; some farmers 
there and elsewhere were able to put in crops in 1933 and 1934 
with RFC loans for fertilizer, seed, and spray material.47 By 
planting time in 1933, however, Roosevelt’s Hundred Days had 
begun. Of its flood of measures, relief and credit provisions 
mattered most to Maine farmers; the early agricultural recovery 
initiatives, except for milk pricing, were not helpful to them.
Direct federal relief to the jobless came in May 1933 with the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), headed by 
Harry Hopkins. Half of its original $500 million was set aside for 
the states on a matching ($ 1 federal for every $ 3 state) basis, while 
the rest would be granted where needs were too great for 
matching to work. Of the more than $22 million spent on relief 
between April 1933 and December 1935 (when the FERA ended 
in Maine), the federal government advanced slightly more than 
half, the state a little more than one-tenth, with the rest coming 
from local funds.48 In addition to outright relief, the program in 
Maine included winter work relief in 1933-1934, surplus com­
modities distribution, and rural rehabilitation.49
During the year beginningjuly 1,1934,80,537 Mainers, on 
a monthly average, received relief. It is impossible to say how 
many of those were rural people, but Aroostook County, at 
13,571, led the list. In 1934-1935 FERA spent $14,644 in rural 
Vassalboro, a town of 1,815 people. The town’s own outlay was 
$55,000. FERA employed men at removing winter-killed apple 
trees, painting and repairing schools and other public buildings, 
and working on bridges. In addition, FERA distributed more 
than 5,000 pounds of fish, 100 boxes of rice, 1,100 pounds of 
potatoes, and 870 cans of meat in Vassalboro.50
A small part of FERA, but a significant one for some farm 
families, was the rural rehabilitation program. The program 
had, at its peak 190 families in Maine. They received loans for 
livestock, equipment, seed, fertilizer, and household goods.
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Those who had lost their farms could be relocated; in fact, FERA 
proposed to purchase 12,000 acres of submarginal land in 
Camden and relocate the 91 families residing there. The plan 
also had a few clients in the St.John Valley. In 1934 only a half- 
dozen houses were repaired with FERA help, but the regional 
adviser found upon inspection that “on the whole a good piece 
of work has been done.”51 When FERA ended, the new Resettle­
ment Administration (RA) assumed its responsibilities, and 
when RA became in 1937 the Farm Security Administration 
(FSA) rehabilitation became even more important to Maine.
Another Hundred Days’ relief program, far better known 
and more popular in Maine, was the Civilian Conservation Corps 
(CCC), approved by Congress in late March 1933. By early 1937 
more than 10,000 Mainers had enlisted in Roosevelt’s “Tree 
Army.” They and their compatriots from other states at the more 
than twenty Maine camps helped cut the Appalachian Trail, 
develop several state parks, improve Acadia National Park, fight 
insect pests and forest fires, clean up after the 1938 hurricane, 
and much more. As late as March 1939, three times the quota 
wanted to join. Fully half of the applicants were from Aroostook 
County.52
The twenty-five dollars a month that CCC enlistees sent 
home helped many families, as had FERA’s relief programs, but 
relief was essentially a short-term strategy. To survive as farmers, 
thousands of Mainers needed credit. Many Maine banks did not 
reopen after the March 1933 Bank Holiday, and those that did 
were extremely careful with loans. In all of 1933, Aroostook 
banks lent a measly $148,000.53 Nearly two decades earlier, 
Congress had created the Federal Land Bank. To build upon it 
in a hurry, the New Dealers provided for new, long-term, lower 
interest Land Bank Commissioner loans, which also allowed for 
extensions for delinquent borrowers.54 They organized twelve 
regional corporations to provide groups of farmers with man­
agement and start-up capital to set up production credit associa­
tions.
Both new programs had a solid impact on Aroostook 
County. Between May 1933 and December 1941,1,437 county
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farmers — nearly one-fourth of the total — borrowed over $3.4 
million under the Land Bank Commissioner loan scheme. Even 
more important in 1934, 1935, and 1936 was the Aroostook 
Production Credit Association. It advanced more than $6 
million which was over half of the money Aroostook farmers 
borrowed to plant, spray, cultivate, and dig their crops in those 
years. It made, however, too many bad loans and in March 1937 
went into receivership. Other agencies, especially the FSA, 
picked up the load.55
The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the 
New Deal’s first major attempt at farm recovery, had far less 
importance to Maine than its relief and credit measures. The 
AAA’s attempt to raise prices of staples like wheat, corn, and 
cotton by paying benefits (derived from a processing tax) to 
those farmers who cut back on planting increased the price of 
grain purchased by Maine dairy and poultry farmers, and also 
made prices higher in the stores. The law, on the other hand, 
allowed for minimum prices for interstate milk sales, a benefit to 
Maine dairymen who produced for the Boston market.56
Maine’s U.S. Representative from Aroostook County had 
attempted unsuccessfully to include potatoes on the AAA’s list. 
In August 1935, Representative Warren of North Carolina 
persuaded Congress to do so. Maine farmers, made desperate 
by the 1934 disaster, backed the potato control law. When it 
passed, the harvest was at hand; the government ordered that 10 
percent of the 1935 crop be plowed under.57 For 1936, Washing­
ton targeted a crop of 222.6 million bushels, allocated 32.7 
million of them (the largest quota) to Maine, and provided that 
any more potatoes marketed would be prohibitively taxed.58 All 
of these plans, however, came to nothing when the Supreme 
Court struck down the AAA in January 1936.
Its replacements, the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allot­
ment Act of 1936 and the so-called “Second AAA” of 1938, were 
litde more relevant to Maine farmers, since both applied only to 
the “basic crops” which were not raised here. But the Soil 
Conservation Service, established in 1935 under the United 
States Department of Agriculture to control erosion, caught on:
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the Grange gave its blessing, andby 1940,18,000 Maine fanners, 
nearly half the total, were participating in the program.59 From 
1937 through 1939, Maine received nearly $2 million under it. 
Mainers (especially in Aroostook County), also benefited from 
the 1937 Marketing Agriculture Act, which set up the Federal 
Surplus Commodity Corporation to buy up surpluses in areas 
where two-thirds of the farmers would agree to limit their 
marketing. Even though Aroostook farmers were the only 
potato producers to reject the idea in 1937, the FSSC bought up 
much of the surplus that year anyway, diverting some of it to 
starch mills, and the rest to government relief and to exports.60
In the later 1930s, relief — now more combined with efforts 
at rehabilitation — continued beside these attempts to stabilize 
production. The CCC continued until the early wartime years, 
as did the new agency created in 1935 to replace FERA, the 
Works Progress Administration. As the name implies, the WPA 
was designed to put to work “employable” persons who could 
not secure other work, leaving the “unemployables” to local and 
state authorities. It fell far short, however, of achieving this 
purpose. At its peak in Maine it employed 14,000 persons, 
averaging only 8,000; Lawrence Lashbrook’s study of the WPA 
in Maine estimates that at least 25,000 would have qualified. The 
WPA, however, did make a difference. By the end of 1935, its 
first year, 1,047 projects valued at over $107 million were 
approved for the state. Three categories (roads, sewage plants, 
and sanitation projects) received more than 80 percent of the 
money, with smaller allocations to recreational work, sewing 
programs for women, white-collar positions for both genders, 
and even a small number of jobs for writers, artists, and musi­
cians.61
Many towns used WPA funds put men to work on local 
roads and bridges; Buckfield, among others, also used them to 
repair schools and help orchardists.62 When the 1938 hurricane 
blew down millions of trees in western Maine, Governor Lewis 
G. Barrows asked for $650,000 in clean-up funds. Three years 
later, former Governor Brann’s appeal for WPA help in eastern 
Maine received a personal promise from Roosevelt to ask “the
MAINE'S RURAL COMMUNITY
160
MAINE’S RURAL COMMUNITY
WPA man who is in charge in eastern Maine to let you know how 
we can help the unemployed down there.”63
WPA aided some rural people, but the FSA’s main purpose 
was to lielp the rural poor to stay on their farms. As such, it 
received bitter criticism from organizations like the American 
Farm Bureau Federation and influential politicians who saw the 
less well-off rural people as poor managers who ought to stop 
farming.64 Congressional conservatives, calling it a “liberal 
attempt to redistribute wealth” kept it underfunded from the 
start. In 1946 the Farmers Home Administration took over its 
loan programs and liquidated the rest.65
In Maine FSA lent millions of dollars to thousands of 
farmers in its Rural Rehabilitation program. Most of the 
recipients were in Aroostook County, where FSA began by 
rescuing farmers left high and dry in 1937 by the collapse of the 
Aroostook County Production Credit Association. At the end of 
1939, Aroostook farmers comprised half of the agency’s 2,400 
Maine borrowers. Penobscot, Somerset, and(Washington coun­
ties trailed far behind. Maine received more loans than any other 
of the eleven Northeastern states in FSA’s Region l.66
The state’s hardest-hit rural region, the St, John Valley, 
fittingly received most help. Here as elsewhere, FSA’s Rural 
Rehabilitation agents worked closely with clients; indeed, they 
assumed many duties of county agents in an area where the latter 
had not worked before, largely because of the predominant use 
of French. FSA people, some of whom could speak French, 
advised farmers in preparing the annual farm plans necessary to 
get a production loan, even helping with the paperwork for other 
national and state agencies. Agents visited families several times 
during the season; female agents worked with wives in keeping 
farm records, gardening, canning, and child care.67
Holding that families could not farm successfully without 
good health, FSA began as early as March 1938 to organize a 
group medical care plan in the county. At first the Aroostook 
Medical Society favored it, but the Maine Medical Society op­
posed it from the start. Negotiations dragged on, and FSA 
compromised, but to no avail. By the end of 1939 FSA admitted
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defeat, and Aroostook was prevented from joining the 634 
counties in 31 other states where more than 300,000 rural people 
enjoyed such plans. FSA could, however, and did send in teams 
of doctors and dentists in the summer of 1940 to examine its 
clients and do the operations, fillings, and so on that were 
necessary. Tooth decay was the biggest problem they found; 
otherwise, children were generally in good health, and nutrition 
“seemed to be excellent” in the Valley.68
FSA’s extensive files on Maine farms include a wealth of 
detail about rural life in the Valley in the late 1930s and early 
1940s. Some FSA clients failed or barely survived, but others 
prospered, like Claude Levesque of Van Buren. He received 
more than $8,500 in loans between 1937 and 1942. Levesque, a 
grower of table stock, was more than $3,700 in debt when he 
began with FSA. The agency shifted him to raising seed potatoes, 
taught him the latest techniques, and worked with him and his 
wife on record-keeping and canning vegetables. The last letter 
in his file, written on March 6,1944, reveals that all his debts were 
paid and that his net worth is $42,800.69
Such successes were exceptional, but federal relief, employ­
ment, rehabilitation, and credit programs did much for Maine 
people which simply would not have been done by state and local 
governments alone. From 1933 through 1939 Maine received 
more than a quarter of a billion dollars ($267,853,368, or 
$336.07 per capita) in New Deal expenditures, loans, and insur­
ance.70
Despite all the efforts of local, state, and federal authorities, 
hard times persisted at the end of the decade. Maine farm 
proprietors’ income, 100 percent of the national figure in 1930- 
1935, dropped to 82.1 percent in 1936- 1941.71 Still, the trend 
was upward in Maine farming by 1940. Maine’s production of 
eggs for local and Boston markets grew rapidly in the late 1930s 
and still faster once Lend Lease brought a new oudet in Britain 
after March 1941. Dairying, the mainstay of most central and 
southern Maine farmers, improved after a 1939 court decision 
upheld the federal marketing program. Milk prices were ‘‘quite 
satisfactory” in 1940 and “much higher" at the end of 1941.72 The
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A variety of federal programs like the Farm Security Administration helped stem the tide of farm foreclosures and keep Maine people on their 
farms. They provided loans and in some cases jobs, introduced new techniques and new crops, and offered health care and other services that 
were not available through local or state government
defense build-up and its newjobs in 1941 finally brought Maine’s 
premier crop out of the doldrums. Potato prices, never really 
good in the late 1930s, were “far below the cost of production” 
at the end of 1940. A year later, with Pearl Harbor only days 
away, the oudook for potatoes had improved considerably. Real 
prosperity in Aroostook County would come slowly, however; in 
1942 nearly half the county’s farms still owed delinquent taxes.73
Although Maine’s recovery from agricultural depression 
had been halting and partial, the hard years had brought 
important changes. Paradoxically, even the almost unchanged 
number of farms in 1940 meant that the movement toward the 
cities had been at least temporarily checked. Moreover, the long­
standing outmigration from the state slowed to a trickle as 
opportunities elsewhere disappeared.74
Responding to lower prices and government programs, 
farmers raised nearly 20,000 fewer acres of potatoes in 1939 than 
in 1932. Dairy farmers, however, kept 132,000 cows as compared 
to 124,000 in 1929. Poultry raising had expanded as well. Much 
less hay was raised, and farms used many fewer horses and more 
tractors: 19 percent in 1940, as opposed to only 8 percent of 
Maine farms in 1930, had tractors. More farms had trucks, while 
the proportion of those with automobiles remained nearly the 
same. In 1940 slightly over half the farmers could drive them 
directly onto an “all-weather” road, a situation which had changed 
litde during the depression years.75
The same era saw farmhouses with telephones decline 
substantially, but far more added electricity. In 1930 only 33.1 
percent had power, but in 1940 electricity was extended to 54.1 
of Maine farm homes. Such an increase was far below the 
national gain of 300 percent.76 Maine, to be sure, had less far to 
go than many states, but the Rural Electrification Administration 
(REA), so effective elsewhere, was hamstrung here by the oppo­
sition of private power companies and by the slow response of 
the Public Utilities Commission to requests from the few coop­
eratives formed to take advantage of the REA.77 Electrification 
continued at a surprisingly rapid pace in the early 1940s, exceed­
ing 60 percent by 1944. In those prosperous war years purchas­
ing power of the four leading types of Maine farms soared to 119
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percentofthe 1910-1914base figure.78 Potatoes led the way, with 
huge wartime crops selling at guaranteed high prices. Dairymen, 
though handicapped by short grain supplies early in the war, did 
better as it went on.79 Producers of eggs and poultry, which were 
in high demand as well, continued to thrive. Even pulpwood and 
lumber sales rebounded, increasing farmers’ ready cash.80
During these good years, fear of postwar competition and 
renewed hard times was never far away. Nor could many forget 
that history’s bloodiest war was making this possible. Though 
Maine was spared its physical destruction, casualty reports came 
home to every village and town.
On a less profound level, the good times also brought new 
problems with them. With higher prices came costs that nearly 
tripled during the war.81 Opening more farm deferments in early 
1943 helped relieve an acute labor scarcity, and farmers also used 
teen-age boys, called “Victory Farm Volunteers,” along with 
hundreds of young women from the Women’s Emergency Farm 
Service, German P.O.W.’s (especially in the potato harvest), Boy 
Scouts, bean pickers in the “Crop Corps,” and others. Farmers 
worked longer hours, averaging in one study 13.5 hours per day 
rather than 12.5 in peacetime. They put off necessary repairs 
and used more machinery, if they could get it. On the other 
hand, many families were finally able to settle back taxes and 
debts, and even save. Property taxes, which had peaked in 1940 
when Maine had the highest rate of the 48 states, eased in the war 
years.82
In addition to prosperity, the war years brought new strains 
to a rural society already shaken by years of depression. Teach­
ers, still paid a pittance but now able to find better jobs, left in 
droves, so that hundreds of small schools could not open in 
September 1944.83 Older pupils found jobs and left schools; 
those who stayed in school seemed more prone — at least to 
Dexter and Caribou school superintendents — to “juvenile 
delinquency.” Not only the younger generation but also the 
infrastructure had less attention; shortages of labor and materi­
als caused three-fourths of Maine’s road mileage to remain 
“unimproved” in 1944.84
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World War II brought renewed prosperity, but it also created new strains in a rural society 
already shaken by years of depression. These events left their mark, as a self-reliant and 
relatively isolated people came in closer contact with national economic and political 
trends.
Bert Call photo.
Those years saw other changes which lasted far longer than 
rural M aine’s brief postwar prosperity. Although the num ber of 
farms rose slightly statewide, Aroostook, which had lost m ore 
than 700 farms during the 1930s, lost 300 more. The farm 
population dropped by 10 percent during World War II, as men 
left for higher-paying jobs and stayed in them at war’s end.85 
Those who stayed in northern Maine became m ore and m ore 
dependent on federal price-fixing programs. Already the trend 
toward concentration (“Get big or get ou t”) appeared to be 
speeding up.
The Great Depression and World War II thus left their 
marks on Maine’s rural people.86 Although most - except the
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potato growers — did not experience the abysmal prices, steep 
debts, and resulting foreclosures familiar to southern and west­
ern commercial farmers, perennial hard times got worse during 
the 1930s and 1940s. With fewer prospects in the cities, the flight 
from the land and the resulting trend to fewer, larger farms 
slowed here as it did nationally. But these currents ran faster 
again during World War II.
Throughout the entire period, self-reliant and relatively 
isolated people became more connected to national economic 
and political trends and lost much of their independence. The 
help they took with such reluctance from the New Dealers kept 
a bad situation from getting worse, but its accompanying regu­
lations persisted after 1945. War brought a brief spurt of 
prosperity to rural families and their communities, but this 
worldwide cataclysm, like the Great Depression, brought irre­
versible change as well.87 By 1945, in most areas of Maine, the 
end was in sight for rural communities centering economically 
and socially on farms. In all regions, Depression and war wiped 
away even the vestiges of traditional self-sufficiency, and fostered 
closer contact with alien cultures, broader market forces, and 
rules created by distant governments.
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